100 Years of the Creighton Club

1921–2021

Edited by Steve Petersen
(Club President, Spring 2022)

The Sherwood Inn in Skaneateles NY, one of the main historical meeting places of the Creighton Club

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Contents

Introduction

Many of us would like to leave a legacy to philosophy through our individual works. From the perspective of a century later, it's fair to say James Edwin Creighton's legacy was primarily of a different sort: he left lasting institutions that helped enable *collective* philosophy. Aside from founding the club that came to bear his name, he was a founding member and first President of the American Philosophical Association, and he was an early editor in chief of the *Philosophical Review*—both of which, of course, have had enormous influence on the profession. As he put it in his presidential address to the APA, called "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association":[1]

> ... the facts compel us to admit that the insufficiency of the isolated individual and the consequent necessity of cooperation have not been so clearly realized by philosophers as by workers in almost every other department of knowledge. And, as a result, we have perhaps missed to some extent both the feeling of comradeship and also the courage and enthusiastic confidence that springs from working shoulder to shoulder with one's fellows.

JeeLoo Liu also quotes this passage in her history of the Creighton Club. The more things change, the more they stay the same; co-authorship is still comparatively rare in philosophy, and conferences are more specialized than ever. The Creighton Club aims to provide some balance by enforcing a deliberately *generalist* approach, fostering cross-pollination where hyper-specialization threatens. (It is probably not a coincidence that Creighton was a Hegelian, and so sensitive to opportunities for synthesis.)

Aside from the purely epistemic benefits of exchanging ideas across subfields, I was struck by the *therapeutic* role that Creighton hoped a philosophical association could play:

> ... the difficulties and perplexities of the subject tend to exercise a paralyzing effect upon [a philosopher] as he faces his problems alone. Realizing the magnitude of the task and his own insufficiency, he is apt to lose heart and to cry, 'who am I that I should try to read these riddles.' It is not necessary to dwell upon the evil effects which this loss of courage and enthusiasm entails upon the individual both as a man and as a member of society. The remedy is to be found in the development of the consciousness of one's intellectual community and partnership with one's colleagues. The task which seems too hard for the individual appears in a different light when he regards himself as a member of a body of organized workers.

[1] *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XI, No. 3, 219–237, and reprinted below.

Thus,

> if philosophical thinkers are to preserve their full measure of intellectual sanity ... they should, at more or less frequent intervals, be penned up and forced to listen to the views of their fellows, and, so far as possible, forced to understand and appreciate these views.

When we hear other philosophers working on fundamentally different problems we can better triangulate on what's common to the philosophical enterprise. Creighton bravely speaks for many of us—if not all of us—when he suggests that even a good philosopher might just be susceptible to occasional crises of confidence. The remedy, he says, is to humanize the endeavor through camaraderie. The Creighton Club can help resist not just hyper-specialization, then, but also the philosopher's tendency toward rugged individualism.

It is all too easy to dismiss a conference when its program lists few talks directly relevant to our own subfields. We feel like we don't have time for such indulgences—after all, we have *work* to do. But then we might recognize this feeling: it is the same one we might have about exercise, or meditation, or walks with friends. These kinds of "indulgences" have a way of giving our time back to us with a different, and in some ways more valuable, profit. I hope the Creighton Club continues to serve such a function.

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April 2022

Other writings on Creighton Club history

Thanks to Harold Hodes and David White for these documents.

"The History of the Creighton Club" by JeeLoo Liu, 2003

James Edwin Creighton (1861–1924) headed the Sage school of Philosophy at Cornell University from 1892 until his death in 1924. He was born in Nova Scotia, to a farmer's family. He was inspired by professor Jacob Gould Schurman and followed him to Cornell University for his graduate studies. After receiving his Ph.D., Creighton stayed at Cornell through his entire career. Creighton, his colleagues and his students came to dominate both teaching and research in philosophy throughout New York State and beyond. The American Philosophical Association, which continues as the main affiliation for professional philosophers to this day, was founded as a Cornell initiative. J. E. Creighton was elected the first president of the APA. In his presidential address, he discussed the purpose of a philosophical association. Creighton thought that a philosophical association's

function was primarily "in promoting and facilitating the interchange of ideas between the philosophical workers of the present day." He said,

> In every department of investigation the conviction seems to be growing that intellectual companionship and cooperation are essential to real progress. The underlying assumption is that it is necessary in scientific work to combine forces and to work, not as a number of isolated individuals, but as a social group of cooperating minds. We have learned that to isolate oneself intellectually is to render one's work unfruitful; that there is in every generation a main drift of problems within which we must work, if we wish to contribute anything to the common cause.

Even though one can get one's work communicated through books and periodicals, Creighton argued that without interpersonal exchanges of ideas,

> we have perhaps missed to some extent both the feeling of comradeship and also the courage and enthusiastic confidence that springs from working shoulder to shoulder with one's fellows.

To any voluntary association, a major threat is the lack of enthusiasm from its members and the decline of participation. Creighton attributed the cause to a misguided sense of the purpose of a philosophical meeting.

> One not infrequently hears it said that the main purpose of these gatherings is social, to meet one's colleagues personally, to renew old friendships and to form new ones. This is certainly a feature of the meetings which no one will be inclined to underestimate, and the indirect results of such personal intercourse are often of genuine scientific importance. There is a danger, however, if the social advantages are exclusively emphasized, that certain consequences may ensue which would inevitably tend to weaken the influence of the Association and destroy its effectiveness. In the first place, the members may come to feel that they are in no way responsible for the programme, which is after all unimportant, furnishing as it does only an excuse for meeting. And, in consequence of this feeling, they may, when it is not perfectly convenient to attend the meetings, resolve to remain at home, perhaps with the complacent consciousness that in so doing they are not sacrificing anything more essential than their own pleasure."

To avoid this misguided conception and the resulting lack of interest, a philosophical association must strive to have a high standard in its selection of papers.

> By setting a high standard, and demanding that the papers presented shall represent the best work and most original thought of those who offer them, by keeping before us as the main purpose of the organization the advancement of philosophy, this Association may do much both to inspire and direct original work. Above all, it may become an important agent in creating the atmosphere and furthering the spirit which are essential to scholarly research. And this is a matter of the utmost importance, for the atmosphere and the scholarly inspiration are what are most needed.

In 1921, Creighton met with George Cross at the Rochester Theological Seminary and became an enthusiast for the formation of a philosophical club for Upstate (or Western) New York. After his death, the club was renamed "The Creighton Club," and it has met continuously (except for a brief disruption during World War II) down to the present. It is under Creighton's ideals of encouraging philosophical cooperation, promoting philosophical scholarship, and inspiring enthusiasm for philosophy, that the Creighton Club has continued its long-standing tradition in holding semi-annual or annual conferences for the past eighty-two years.

Sources:

- David White, "The Creighton Club and the History of Philosophy, Religion and Reform in Western New York." 2003.
- J. E. Creighton, "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association." Read as the Presidential Address at the first annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, March 31, 1902. First Published in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XI, No. 3, 219–237 [and reprinted below in this history].
- Richard Hull, "James Edwin Creighton." In Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1901–1910. 25–6.

"The Creighton Club: Historical Notes and Reminiscences" by Herman A. Brautigam, 1974

The idea for what we now know as the Creighton Club originated at the Rochester Theological Seminary in 1921, As reported by Dean Emeritus J. W. A. Stewart,

> Dean Creighton was in Rochester giving a few special lectures to a class of mine in the Theological Seminary. While he was here the idea originated in the fertile mind of Dr. George Cross of forming a club. He communicated with a few others who willingly responded, and so the Club was under way.[2]

[2]Letter dated 12/25/46 to Professor Harold Larrabee, Secretary, in response to a greeting from the Club at its 47th meeting at the Cooper Inn, 11/31/46. Larrabee's letter of greeting refers to Dean Stewart as one of the *five* founding members.

In addition to James Creighton and Frank Thilly, Cornell University, the early list of members included Alfred H. Jones, University of Rochester, and John R. Tuttle, Elmira College, both former students of Creighton's; George Cross and Dean Stewart, Rochester Theological Seminary; Allen M. Dulles, Auburn Theological Seminary; George A. Wilson and, possibly, Raymond Piper, Syracuse University; Eugene Bewkes and Howard Jefferson, Colgate University; Richard Boynton, University of Buffalo; Harold Larrabee and Philip Stanley, Union College; and Foster Boswell and Brooks Otis, Hobart College, joined later.

Originally called "The Upstate (or Western) New York Philosophy Club," the club was renamed in honor of Professor Creighton after his death in October, 1924. Creighton may well share honors with Josiah Royce as the two most distinguished Twentieth Century interpreters of Hegelian philosophy in the United States. Creighton's entire philosophical career was Spent at Cornell. A graduate student from 1888 to 1892, he studied also at Berlin and Leipsic before being awarded the Ph.D. at Cornell. Instructor 1889–1892, and Associate Professor 1892–1895, he was appointed Sage Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in 1895, holding that chair until his death.

He served also as Dean of the Graduate School at Cornell from 1914 to 1922. In addition to his teaching and administrative duties at Cornell, Creighton was a leader in the larger philosophical community. From the time of its founding in 1892 he was on the editorial board of the *Philosophical Review*; although he had collaborators, "it was very largely due to Creighton himself that the notable accomplishments and character of that publication are due."[3]

When the American Philosophical Association was founded on November 2, 1901, Creighton was elected President, and at the first regular meeting of the Association, Easter week 1902, the subject for his Presidential Address (*Philosophical Review*, Vol. XI, No. 3) was "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association." The chief purpose, as he thought, was to promote philosophical discussion, the same idea that prompted the founding of the Creighton Club.

Creighton's administrative and teaching duties apparently were given a high priority; consequently the corpus of his published materials is small: His well-known *Introductory Logic* and numerous reviews and articles in philosophical journals, a number of which were collected and edited by Harold Smart, his pupil, under the title, *Studies in Speculative Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1925). His death prevented the fulfillment of the Carus lectureship to which he had been appointed.

During the first fifty meetings of the Creighton Club, the number of institutions represented was small. Auburn Theological Seminary, Colgate University, Cornell University, Elmira College, Hobart College, Union College, the University of Rochester, and Wells College are recorded as places of meetings from 1921–1933. Most of these institutions had very small departments, some with only one

[3]Harold R. Smart in an address before the American Philosophical Association, 1924.

or two teachers of philosophy on their faculties. Attendance at meetings was correspondingly small.

The programs consisted of a major paper read on Saturday evenings and two supposedly shorter ones on Sunday mornings. General participation in the ensuing informal discussion was the rule. Despite occasional spirited exchanges, especially between George Wilson of Syracuse, a committed personalist, and Richard Boynton of the University of Buffalo, a crusty and skeptical critic of any sort of orthodoxy, an atmosphere of friendly intimacy prevailed, notwithstanding that members customarily addressed each other by their surnames. The Creighton Club during its first twenty-five years had indeed many features of a club.

Except for a program committee of three members, there were no officers.[4] Program committee members were elected for three-year terms, and during his third year a member Served as Secretary. No regular dues were assessed; a contribution of fifty cents from each member present at a meeting was sufficient to pay for postage and mimeographing. No "Proceedings" were recorded, so that the cost of mimeographing was small.

During the early years papers were presented on Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Religion, Problems in Ethics and the like.[5] Harold Larrabee, Professor Emeritus of Union College, who began attending meetings about 1927 or 1928 reports[6] his "distinct first impression that the prevailing point of view seemed to be 100% idealism." He remembers also "how hard it was to induce the membership to schedule, and listen to, a paper on Dewey and Pragmatism. That did not happen," as he recalls, "until the early 1930's." The Club, Larrabee thought, was "essentially a Cornell project."

Larrabee's impression was probably correct, but it should not be taken, and of course was not intended, to denigrate the important leadership and distinction that members of the Sage School have given the Club throughout its history. And, idealism continued to be ably represented during the 1930's, among others, by Professor Wilson of Syracuse and Professor G. Watts Cunningham of Cornell, a critical interpreter of the Hegelian tradition. During those years Cunningham was not only a friendly colleague but the acknowledged *primus inter pares* among the Club's members. No meeting seemed complete without his closing comments on the issues raised in papers read and subsequent discussions. I vividly remember him standing before the group jingling the coins and keys in his trouser pockets while making his comments.

As Larrabee suggests, Pragmatic Naturalism had its day in court during the 1930's and 1940's. Although it was actively, even aggressively represented, notably by Larrabee of Union, Paul Ward of Syracuse, and Eugene Adams of Colgate, no philosophical orthodoxy prevailed during these years. Philip Stanley of Union College, an iconoclastic skeptic, saw to that! Papers on a variety of

[4] In the 1940's the number of committee members became four.
[5] Letter dated 2/22/74 from H. R. Smart, Professor Emeritus, Cornell University.
[6] Letter to H. A. Brautigam 11/18/73.

subjects were read and discussed, including newly published works by well-known contemporary philosophers such as R. B. Perry and C. I. Lewis. The philosophy of A. N. Whitehead continued to receive attention from some members and, thanks to Marvin Farber of Buffalo, phenomenology was introduced to the Club. Perhaps it is significant that although the works of Spengler, Mannheim, Pareto, Sartre, Jaspers, and Toynbee provided topics for discussion, no record exists that Marxism received the Club's critical attention.[7] Papers on ethics, logic, and religion appeared on the programs but, again significantly, none on education. The Club did authorize a survey of the teaching of philosophy in the state teachers colleges, conducted by Frederick Dommeyer of St. Lawrence and myself. We found that except for an occasional course with some such title as the "principles and philosophy of education," no philosophy courses were taught at these colleges.

Not until the 1940's did the positivism of Ayer and Carnap, and the more sophisticated studies in philosophical analysis become a subject of major interest in the Club's programs. Max Black and Norman Malcolm of Cornell, and Justus Hartnack of Colgate (now of Brockport), are remembered in this connection. With the appointment of Lewis White Beck at Rochester, Kantian studies were ably represented in the Club. Thanks to Beck, J. H. Paton graced a program of the Club with a paper on Kant. Paton, of course, was only one among a number of distinguished scholars from abroad, such as J. O. Urmson, Peter Geach, Phillipa Foote, G. H. von Wright and Antony Flew, who have from time to time addressed the Club.

The program of the 50th semi-annual meeting of the Club featured a discussion of Professor Creighton's career and philosophy. Harold R. Smart, himself a former student and colleague of Creighton's, spoke on Creighton as teacher, editor, and philosopher, while Dr. Cunningham presented a critical appraisal of Creighton's version of speculative philosophy.

As noted above, Creighton was the first president of the American Philosophical Association. Besides Creighton, the Club can claim a number of former and present members, including Virgil Aldrich, Lewis W. Beck, Max Black, E. A. Burtt, G. Watts Cunningham, Marvin Farber, Norman Malcolm, Arthur E. Murphy, John Rawls, George R. Sabine, and Gregory Vlastos, who have been elected president of one of the Divisions of the Association.

Although the Club is now graced with a number of women members from a variety of institutions, most of the women members in the first three decades of the Club's history taught at Wells College: Ivy G. Campbell, Dorothy Walsh, and Thelma Lavine. Anna M. Weber taught at St. Lawrence University, while Frances D. Hamblin continues an active teaching career at the Rochester Institute of Technology as well as faithful attendance at the Club's meetings.

The post-war years have brought noteworthy developments. Until recently the

[7] George H. Sabine did, however, lead a stimulating discussion of the prospects of democracy (not good, he thought) in the Post War world.

Club had not attracted philosophers from Roman Catholic institutions, but now philosophical colleagues from such institutions, philosophers at Lemoyne College, in particular, responded to the invitation to join. The Club has been entertained at Lemoyne, and philosophers from that college have read papers and joined in discussions at meetings. The general movement toward ecumenicity has thus embraced philosophy too.

The establishment of the State University of New York, with university centers at Albany, Binghamton and Buffalo, and the change of the teachers colleges into State University Colleges with greater emphasis upon the liberal arts and sciences has had its effect on the Club. The establishment of philosophy departments at the university centers and the university colleges has increased dramatically the size of the membership. Although special conferences at some of the State University centers, featuring a brilliant array of distinguished participants, seemed at times to call into question the need for an independent association such as the Creighton Club, these conferences were one-shot affairs. The present vitality of the Club is convincing evidence that its regular program of semi-annual meetings meets a real need.

Organized more than fifty years ago to promote philosophical discussion, the Club has fulfilled in large measure its traditional purpose. In addition it has throughout the years afforded younger philosophers an opportunity to present the results of their investigations for critical appraisal by their colleagues from other institutions. Begun as a club, the organization has now come of age as a full-fledged philosophical association with an appropriately greater formality of organization. This augurs a continuing role of importance in the life of philosophy among the colleges and universities of upstate New York.

Acknowledgments

Except for a Calendar listing places of meetings and speakers from January 1921 through November 1933, no records of the Club's activities before 1941 have come to my attention. Professor James Wilbur, SUNY, Geneseo, New York, kindly supplied the records from 1941 through 1969.

For information about Creighton and the years prior to 1933, I am indebted to Professor Harold R. Smart. Besides several letters in response to my inquiries, he furnished me with a copy of his memorial address to the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1924 as well as a bound copy of essays on "The Philosophy of James Edwin Creighton" by George H. Sabine and Frank Thilly, published in *The Philosophical Review*, 1925.

The letter from Dean Stewart about the founding of the Club was found in Larrabee's file for 1946. It would seem that, along with other offices of the New York State Philosophical Association, that of Archivist should be established.

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"The Purposes of a Philosophical Association", by J. E. Creighton

Read as the Presidential Address at the first annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, March 31, 1902. Reprinted from *The Philosophical Review*, Volume XI, Number 3, pp. 221–237.

In thinking of a fitting subject upon which to address you on this occasion, I had at first planned to consider two or three fundamental problems which seem to me to be pressing themselves upon our attention, in one form or another, in all the philosophical discussions of the present day. What I had hoped to accomplish was, merely by way of orientation, to discuss the significance of some of the recent contributions to these subjects, and to raise the question whether or not an agreement has not been tacitly reached, which will warrant a restatement of these problems in a new and perhaps more fruitful form. It was largely, though not wholly, an increasing sense of the difficulty of the task, and of my own incompetence, which led me to abandon this plan. For, in addition, as the time of meeting drew on, and it appeared that the papers were to be so numerous and so inclusive in character as almost to constitute an embarrassment of philosophical riches, it seemed better that I should choose a subject of a somewhat different nature, but one which I felt it to be important that should in some form be presented for consideration at this our first meeting, the question of "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association."

In general, when one knows what one wants to do, there is no great advantage, I think, in sitting down and deliberately counting up reasons. But, in the present case, where there are many individuals concerned, it will undoubtedly promote mutual understanding, and increase intelligent interest in the affairs of the Association, to raise explicitly the question regarding the purposes of the organization and the advantages which it offers to us. There is a certain danger that one may unconsciously come to put too low an estimate upon these advantages, and so fail to appreciate the more serious side of the matter. One not infrequently hears it said that the purpose of these gatherings is social, to meet one's colleagues personally, to renew old friendships and to form new ones. This is certainly a feature of the meetings which no one will be inclined to underestimate, and the indirect results of such personal intercourse are often of genuine scientific importance. There is a danger, however, if the social advantages are exclusively emphasized, that certain consequences may ensue which would inevitably tend to weaken the influence of the Association and destroy its effectiveness. In the first place, the members may come to feel that they are in no way responsible for the programme, which is after all unimportant, furnishing as it does only an excuse for meeting. And, in consequence of this feeling, they may, when it is not

perfectly convenient to attend the meetings, resolve to remain at home, perhaps with the complacent consciousness that in so doing they are not sacrificing anything more essential than their own pleasure.

It is the conviction that these are not merely imaginary dangers that has led to invite you to reflect for a little on some of the ends which may be realized through the Association; and, incidentally, upon the responsibilities that we have assumed in becoming members. I wish, however, to preface what I have to say with a remark or two, which may prevent misconceptions regarding the meaning and scope of my discussion. In the first place, I would ask you not to suppose from my remarks that I regard the new Association as a kind of universal panacea for all the ills from which philosophy suffers. An association can only act as one cooperating agency among others, or, at most, prove a stimulus to the forces which are essential for progress in philosophical work. And, secondly, I do not intend to discuss the question of the proper scope of a philosophical association, the particular means which it should employ in order to attain its ends, but simply to attempt to indicate what I believe these ends to be.

The most striking characteristic of all modern scientific work is found in the fact that it is the result of conscious cooperation between a number of individuals. This feature has always characterized to some extent the efforts of those who have attained real results in the search for truth, but it has become more conscious and more prominent during the present generation. It is important to remember, however, that even those pioneers of modern thought whom we usually picture to ourselves as wrapped in solitary cogitation did not work in independence of their fellows and contemporaries. When Descartes retired to Holland in 1629 to work out his new system, he thought it necessary to keep in touch with the scholars of the time through Father Mersenne, and from time to time to request their criticisms of his views. Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* grew out of meetings and discussions with a number of friends. Even Spinoza, who is often regarded as an absolutely solitary thinker, was in constant communication with a circle of scientific friends, and carried on occasional correspondence with some of the most noted thinkers of his day. In 1660, the Royal Society of London was founded, after having existed for a number of years as an informal club. In 1700, Leibniz founded the Academy of Sciences at Berlin, and a few years later organized a similar society at Vienna. In addition, I may mention the extensive scientific correspondence of the pioneers of science in all departments as evidence of the important role personal intercourse played in the development of modern thought. From these and other facts which might easily be cited, it is evident that the necessities of cooperation and mutual help in scientific work were more or less completely realized at an early date. In all of these circumstances, we can discover the effort of the individual to free himself from the idols of the cave, by appealing to the reason of his fellows to confirm or correct his own subjective opinions. It is the realization of the necessity of a more extended as well as a more systematic and intimate comparison of views among workers in the same field that has led to the multiplication of scientific associations and organizations in the present generation.

Philosophers have been slower than their fellow workers in inaugurating any movement to secure this end. They have, however, been largely occupied with a different, though somewhat similar, undertaking. In philosophy, it is perhaps more essential than in any other field of inquiry that one should build upon the work of one's predecessors. This is a truth that philosophical students of the present day have realized pretty thoroughly. Indeed, in recent years it has been a frequent reproach that the study of philosophy has reduced itself largely to a study of the history of philosophy, that the interest in systems of the past has displaced that in constructive problems. There is perhaps sufficient truth in this charge to prevent us from denying it unqualifiedly: there is a tendency in every kind of undertaking to mistake the means for the end. In general, however, it may be said that the total absorption of the present time in historical questions is more apparent than real. Moreover, philosophy has certainly gained much from the detailed historical investigations of the past generation. This gain does not chiefly lie in the additional scholarship and critical acumen which such investigations involve, but rather in the fact that it makes possible a more adequate comprehension of the genesis and meaning of our own problems. It is only through an understanding of the history of the past that we can rightly appreciate the questions that press for an answer at the present time, and know in what terms they can be intelligibly formulated and answered. It is well to remember, then, when we grow impatient with historical studies, that these are not investigations which this or any other generation can put behind them and have done with. The effort to gain a truer appreciation of the thought of the past will always remain an essential part of philosophical study. To undertake to philosophize without an accurate and sympathetic knowledge of the development of philosophical conceptions is not only vain and fruitless, but it is hopelessly to lose oneself, and to commit intellectual suicide. The character of many books that still appear year by year on philosophical subjects, written frequently by men of ability and of reputation in other fields, but in utter ignorance and disregard of the history of philosophy, illustrates and justifies my statement.

It is not less study of the past that we need, but, doubtless, a more intelligent and discriminating study. And this means a study of historical systems in the light of our own problems. Facts without ideas are simply confusing: Knowledge of the details of philosophical systems without any insight into the inner meaning of things, or ability to distinguish between the external form and the vital essence, is certain to bewilder rather than to bring enlightenment. Perhaps in this historical and evolutionary age, when the continuity between the thought of the present and that of the past is so strongly emphasized, there is some danger that in the study of the history of philosophy we may continue to busy ourselves with problems that are either outworn, or at least presuppose in their formulation conceptions that are hopelessly antiquated. It is necessary to recognize that there is a dead as well as a living past, that many of its problems, in the form in which they were stated, have been superseded, because they rest upon principles and assumptions which the drift of things has shown to be untenable.

And this brings me to the main proposition which I have here in view. The

history of philosophy is only intelligible when read in the light of present-day problems. Not only is it true that, from a strictly philosophical standpoint, the study of the thought of the past can never be anything more than a means to the better comprehension of the problems of the present time, but, in itself, the former remains to a large extent incomprehensible except as its disputes and questionings are brought into relation to our own problems, and interpreted in their light. It is, of course, necessary to keep in mind the danger of doing violence to historical fact by construing a past system wholly in terms of conceptions which belong to a later time. Nevertheless, if we would understand the systems of the past, we must read them as the records of the thoughts of men who were struggling with the same stubborn questions which concern us. It follows then, I think, that it is only one who has pondered on philosophical problems for himself who can intelligently study the history of philosophy. To undertake to carry on such studies in an external and purely pragmatic fashion would be to adopt a method which would certainly defeat its own ends. If either historical or constructive work in philosophy is to prove fruitful, the two sides cannot be separated, but must be carried on in close connection, the past being used to reveal the present to itself, and the present to unlock the secrets of the past.

It does not seem too much to assume that the meetings of the Association will not be without influence in promoting the study of the history of philosophy in general. Moreover, since the interest of such meetings is likely to be largely centered in the actual problems of the present time, we may perhaps hope that there will be a tendency to bring these studies into closer and more intimate relation to our own philosophical standpoint. But it is more particularly in promoting and facilitating the interchange of ideas between the philosophical workers of the present day, who are scattered throughout this part of the country, that the Association will find its main function. In every department of investigation the conviction seems to be growing that intellectual companionship and cooperation are essential to real progress. The underlying assumption is that it is necessary in scientific work to combine forces and to work, not as a number of isolated individuals, but as a social group of cooperating minds. We have learned that to isolate oneself intellectually is to render one's work unfruitful; that there is in every generation a main drift of problems within which we must work, if we wish to contribute anything to the common cause.

We have seen, however, that the facts compel us to admit that the insufficiency of the isolated individual and the consequent necessity of cooperation have not been so clearly realized by philosophers as by workers in almost every other department of knowledge. And, as a result, we have perhaps missed to some extent both the feeling of comradeship and also the courage and enthusiastic confidence that springs from working shoulder to shoulder with one's fellows. The main reason for this tardiness on the part of philosophical thinkers to recognize as clearly as their scientific brethren the need of cooperation lies in the nature of the subject itself. On account of the extent of the field and the difficulty in obtaining a synoptic view, one may regard the line of investigation pursued by one's neighbor as completely erroneous and directly opposed to one's own,

though, in reality, it furnishes exactly the facts which are necessary to correct and complement our own defects and one-sidedness. Another reason doubtless is found in the fact that philosophical theories, like theological tenets, are so closely related to what is most intimate and fundamental to our personal nature, and, consequently, so suffused with emotion, that it is difficult to be tolerant and fair with those who differ from us. This feeling has not only divided philosophers into schools, but has frequently led them to ignore entirely the work of their opponents, or to regard them as perverters of the truth with whom they can hold no commerce. Other influences, such as university or individual rivalries, may of course also operate to prevent unity and sympathetic understanding among philosophical thinkers. But there are many signs, of which the formation of this Association is but one, that there is a growing consciousness on the part of philosophers of the necessity of coming to understand even those from whom they differ, and of recognizing in them allies and helpers in the common cause. I wish to point out in a little more detail why such cooperation is necessary, and also to give some reasons for believing that the personal intercourse afforded by the meetings of the Association may aid very effectively in promoting this end.

Befose proceeding in this direction, however, I may be allowed to refer to an objection which my previous statements may seem to have left out of account. It may be held that at the present day printing has taken the place of personal communication, that books and periodical literature adequately fulfill the functions which I have been claiming for the Association, and that, therefore, the latter is in no sense essential. To this it may be added that any association must consist of a limited number of men, from a restricted area of country; while if one knows three or four modern languages, one can by reading share the best thoughts of the leaders of the philosophical world. The objection would have weight only if it were claimed that the meetings of the Association could in any degree excuse members from the necessity of following the thoughts of contemporary writers, as these are found in current books and magazine literature. It is not as a substitute for current literature, but as a supplement to it, that we may hope that the personal intercourse afforded by the Association will prove useful. Perhaps it is not too much to assume that those who offer papers will feel it necessary to present their theories in relation to the most recent discussions of the subject. But, in addition to this, there are undoubtedly certain advantages essential to philosophical work to be derived from personal association and intercourse, which are scarcely obtainable in any other way. I now propose, at the risk of some repetition, to consider some of these advantages in more detail.

In the first place, then, it can scarcely be doubted that philosophy, of all species of scientific inquiry, is that which demands, in order to be fruitfully prosecuted, the closest and most intimate intellectual relations between a number of minds. This is true for a variety of reasons. One of the most obvious of these is found in the fact that in these days we have abandoned the attempt to deduce a philosophy of the world from fundamental first principles, by means of deductive arguments, and have frankly adopted the inductive method of procedure. I do not, of course, mean by this that philosophy, or any other branch of inquiry,

confines itself to induction in the narrower sense of the word, but merely that, in common with all the sciences of the present day, it sees that its starting point and basis must be the facts of experience. When this is granted, it becomes at once evident that the data of the philosopher are so complex and many-sided that, working by himself, he is certain to fail to take account or properly estimate some facts of importance. Again, he must approach these facts through his own individual mind, that is to say, with the particular set of concepts furnished him by his own education and reflection. But it is essential that philosophy should work regressively as well as progressively: it must criticise its presuppositions, and cannot, as do the other sciences, take its standpoint for granted. Now it is evident that no single individual can look, as it were, in all directions at once. He has then constant need of criticism, of supplementation, and of having objections forced upon his attention. It does not seem too much to say that this need can be most effectively supplied through personal intercourse with others. For when objections and opposing views are backed by the immediate presence of one's neighbor, they cannot easily be ignored. Moreover, after a man's views have ceased to be fluid, and have assumed the rigidity of cold print, he is not in the same degree open to criticism, or so likely to benefit by it.

The advantages of social cooperation in philosophical study were most completely realized in the Greek schools, and particularly in the school of Socrates and those of his immediate successors. In the Socratic method of inquiry, as it is represented to us in Plato's dialogues, a number of persons combine in the search for philosophical truth; and to the result the most various classes of men, cultured young aristocrats of Athens, tradesmen, sophists, men of affairs, and inexperienced youths, are made to contribute. Dialectic, as described and illustrated by Plato, is essentially the method of critical induction, the method of analyzing facts to discover conceptions, and of testing conceptions in the light of new facts. Of course, the method is the same in principle whether it involves a literal talking back and forth, or takes the form of self-criticism, or of a comparison of views with the printed theories of other men. No one would maintain that in modern times dialectic in its literal and original meaning can take the place of either of the other forms of criticism, in the sense of rendering them unnecessary. But, for the reasons I have already urged, it still remains an important and necessary supplement to less insistent forms of criticism, and, at its best (that is, where the objections of the critic are carefully thought out), it has the power to supply something which the other forms wholly lack.

It is perhaps only a corollary from this to state that, for the majority of men at least, intellectual contact and personal intercourse with their fellow workers in the same field are essential conditions of complete sanity of view. There are a number of circumstances, inherent in the nature of philosophical study, which render it easier to lose oneself in subjective fancies in this field than in the realm of the objective sciences. And to this we must add that nowhere is a lack of sanity more absolutely fatal. I have already spoken of the abortive philosophical results of even able thinkers when they write in ignorance of the history of the past. Isolation from one's contemporaries, however, is equally

injurious, and brings in its train idiosyncrasies and peculiarities which lower, if they do not altogether destroy, the value of the individual's work. To be insane in the full sense of the word is just to lose connection with one's fellows, to fall away from the objective and rational order of things, and to be possessed by subjective fancies and illusions. For a philosophical thinker to stand apart from the thought of his own age, to refuse to see anything of importance in the work of his contemporaries, or to condemn their results as entirely perverted and erroneous, is to imperil not only his own usefulness, but his philosophical sanity as well. This does not mean that a philosopher must follow the crowd, and not as an independent thinker protest against what he regards as wrong methods and erroneous results. No! Rather on occasion he must be ready to cry, *Althanasius contra mundum!* But then he must be ready, like Athanasius, to fight it out, and to fight it out with an open mind. To stand completely aloof from "this wicked and perverse generation" in which one lives, to regard one's fellow workers as "mostly fools," in addition to the moral consequences which it entails, both reacts injuriously upon one's scientific effectiveness, and also tends to destroy one's scientific sanity. This tendency to isolation in philosophical work seems to me not wholly unknown even at the present day. I have doubtless set before you the extreme case and spoken of the extreme penalty. But I cannot doubt that nearly every one has at some time, and to some extent, suffered intellectually from this tendency. The most obvious and perhaps the most indispensable means of grace is the printed page, an open-minded study of the printed work of our fellows. It is true, however, that this study is induced and its value enhanced by personal intercourse with the writers. Moreover, it must be added that whenever personal acquaintance is possible, it is perhaps the most effective means of promoting intellectual sympathy and understanding, and of making clear to workers in the same field their unity of purpose, and the mutually complementary nature of their results. One may ignore or almost totally misunderstand the published views of another man; but when these are reinforced by the living personality they cannot so readily be either ignored or misunderstood. It seems to me essential, then, if philosophical thinkers are to preserve their full measure of intellectual sanity, that they should, at more or less frequent intervals, be penned up and forced to listen to the views of their fellows, and, so far as possible, forced to understand and appreciate these views.

If we still go on to consider the matter from the standpoint of the members who compose the Association, there is a further point which may be urged. The problems of philosophy are vastly difficult and complex. We are sometimes told that they are insoluble, and that we spend our strength for nought. There are even distinguished philosophical scholars who say that all metaphysical theories are subjective dreams—necessary, indeed, to beings such as we are—but altogether outside the pale of objective and verifiable fact. Though the individual struggles bravely against this conclusion, the difficulties and perplexities of the subject tend to exercise a paralyzing effect upon him as he faces his problems alone. Realizing the magnitude of the task and his own insufficiency, he is apt to lose heart and to cry, 'who am I that I should try to read these riddles.' It

is not necessary to dwell upon the evil effects which this loss of courage and enthusiasm entails upon the individual both as a man and as a member of society. The remedy is to be found in the development of the consciousness of one's intellectual community and partnership with one's colleagues. The task which seems too hard for the individual appears in a different light when he regards himself as a member of a body of organized workers. The sense of comradeship, of working with others for a common end, which is brought home to one most forcibly by personal contact, arouses enthusiasm and friendly emulation that issue in a courageous determination on the part of individuals to play their role and contribute in some way to the accomplishment of the common task. It is the development of this feeling of intellectual fellowship and cooperation that is the most hopeful sign of all scientific work at the present day. It is also to a large extent the source of the inspiration which animates all modern investigation and scholarship. No one would maintain that this spirit is less essential in philosophical work than in other fields of inquiry. Nevertheless, I think that it is not too much to say that there does not yet exist in philosophy, either the external organization for cooperation that has already been set on foot in the natural sciences, nor even the intimate feeling of fraternity which binds together the workers in many of these fields. Just what is possible in the way of establishing external means of mutual help, I am not now prepared to discuss. But meeting together for a common purpose will undoubtedly aid in developing that sympathy and understanding which must be the basis for all plans of external cooperation.

These consequences, I think, may, to some extent at least, be expected to follow as incidental results of the existence of the Association. They can scarcely be said, however, to be included in the ends at which the Association should deliberately aim. The main purpose which we *should* conscientiously set before us, it seems to me, is to promote and encourage original investigation and publication. It does not, indeed, seem unreasonable to assume that this end also will in some measure be realized indirectly through the stimulus and inspiration afforded by the meetings. But, in addition, I think that it is possible for the Association consciously and deliberately to do something toward the promotion of this result. This does not necessarily imply the setting of prize questions, or the employment of any external agencies whatever. But the efficiency and helpfulness of the Association in this respect will depend upon the spirit in which it does its work. By setting a high standard, and demanding that the papers presented shall represent the best work and most original thought of those who offer them, by keeping before us as the main purpose of the organization the advancement of philosophy, this Association may do much both to inspire and direct original work. Above all, it may become an important agent in creating the atmosphere and furthering the spirit which are essential to scholarly research. And this is a matter of the utmost importance, for the atmosphere and the scholarly inspiration are what are most needed. The conditions in American academic life which are unfavorable to original scholarship have often been made the subject of comment. The majority of the members of this Association are teachers, who

can undoubtedly plead as an excuse for their unproductiveness the demands of what one of our German colleagues has happily characterized as, *die zeitraubende und kraftabsorbirende academische Lehrthatigkeit.* But however unfavorable the conditions are, they are not likely to change greatly in our day, and we cannot maintain that they entirely excuse us from producing something. Indeed, in general we recognize this obligation, and keep on hoping that next year or the year after we shall find time to do something worth while. In the meantime, the fact remains that, with a few notable exceptions, the philosophical scholars of America are comparatively unproductive. Can this Association do anything to change this state of affairs? It all depends, as I have said, upon the spirit of the Association itself. If we do not take the meetings very seriously, if we meet in an easy-going way to listen to papers which were written to read and do not represent any real research or deep thought, we may have 'a pleasant and profitable time' (as they say at the teachers' meetings) but we shall not do anything to promote American philosophical scholarship.

I have said that the promotion of philosophical scholarship and research is the only object capable of affording a purpose common to all the members of the Association, and an interest which is likely to be serious and lasting. And in this connection I should like to express my opinion that it would be a mistake to make the discussion of methods of teaching philosophy a coordinate purpose, or even to introduce papers on this subject into the programme of the meetings. Even if the membership of the Association were composed wholly of teachers of philosophy, which will never, I hope, be the case, the meetings should not, it seems to me, be occupied with the consideration of such secondary and subordinate topics. This opinion is based not merely on the personal feeling that the discussion of methods of teaching philosophy is in itself rather a stupid way of wasting time, but on the conviction that even in our capacity as teachers it is courage and inspiration to attack problems for ourselves, to go to firsthand sources and so actually discover by our own efforts what we teach to students, that is the one thing needful. In dealing with university students one may surely be allowed to tell one's story in one's own way. The important thing is that one shall have something of one's own to tell, something in the importance of which one thoroughly believes, and which has cost real effort to discover. It seems to me, then, that it will be an advantage in every way for the members of this Association to forget, so far as possible, their profession during the days of meeting, and to come together simply as human beings interested in philosophical investigation and scholarship.

It may not be inappropriate to the present occasion to call attention to the standing of philosophy in the learned world as a specialized subject of inquiry. If we look at the country as a whole it does not seem too much to say that philosophy does not enjoy the general recognition, even among educated men, that is accorded to many of the other sciences, nor is the philosophical teacher and writer universally conceded to be a specially trained scholar whose opinions in his own field are as much entitled to respect as those of the physicist or biologist in his special domain. In many colleges and universities the place of philosophy is only grudgingly conceded. It is regarded as a more or less useful

handmaid to theology, or perhaps to education, but its scientific status as a real and independent subject of investigation is tacitly or explicitly denied. Again, men wholly unschooled in the subject frequently feel themselves competent not only to write philosophical books and articles, but they not infrequently exhibit the greatest contempt for professional philosophers, and confidently proclaim their own short and easy answers to the riddles of the universe. If we admit that this general attitude towards philosophy exists, it becomes necessary to seek for the causes through which it has arisen. I shall not attempt to furnish any exhaustive enumeration of these causes. To some extent the explanation may be found in the fact that the problems of philosophy arise only through reflection, and are, therefore, not at once evident to the outsider. One cannot point to definite phenomena of sense as the subject matter of philosophy, as is possible to do in the case of physical sciences. The whole inquiry consequently seems to the unreflective person mysterious and fantastical. In addition to this inherent difficulty, however, philosophy has undoubtedly been injured in public esteem by the subordinate and ancillary position which it so long occupied in this country. The result of making philosophy the handmaid of theology is always the same—philosophy, so fettered, degenerates into empty logomachies and lifeless definitions and justly becomes a byword and reproach among real thinkers. If at the present time philosophy has again raised its head as a free inquiry, it nevertheless still continues to suffer as a consequence of its former empty character and subordinate position.

It is, however, fruitless to dwell upon this subject if we propose to deny that we are ourselves in any measure responsible for the present condition of affairs. But it is impossible, I think, to avoid the conclusion that if philosophy does not occupy the place in public esteem which properly belongs to it, the fault must lie to some extent with its present representatives. There are two indictments which may, with some show of reason, be urged against professional philosophers. In the first place, it can scarcely be said that as a class they display the same zeal in original investigation, or the same scholarly devotion to their subject that is exhibited by many other groups of scientific workers. The result is that outsiders are not quite convinced that philosophers are in earnest, or that they believe in the seriousness of their own work. But secondly, and principally, the educated outsider withholds his recognition from philosophy, because he believes that it has been barren of real results. Now, in spite of frequent murmurs about 'Philistinism,' this demand for practical results is not in itself unreasonable. It is unreasonable only if the results demanded are of a kind that from the very nature of the case philosophy cannot supply—as, for example, a worldly wisdom like that of the Sophists, or short and simple answers to ultimate problems. But philosophy must bake *some* bread; it must, like the other sciences, minister to human life. This demand cannot be escaped by the plea that philosophy concerns itself with the theoretical, not the practical, aspect of affairs. For we cannot divorce the intellectual and the practical, or say that one is for the sake of the other. Intelligence, when it is complete intelligence, is itself practical; and the will of a rational being is also intelligence. One cannot escape the conclusion

that a lack of practicality in philosophical results indicates a corresponding defect upon the intellectual side, a failure to grasp the significant facts, or an occupation with isolated minor points while cowardly shirking the main issues. In no other way can we explain the charge of unfruitfulness which is so insistently brought against philosophy. Is it not true, for example, that during the present generation we have debated too exclusively the question whether or not we can know reality, and discussed historical problems in too abstract a fashion? At any rate, the general feeling of the time may perhaps be taken as evidence that the representatives of philosophy have not convinced the public that their results are capable of becoming vital and directing influences in the spiritual life of the individual and of society at the present day.

It is not necessary at this point to discuss the question of how the status of philosophy may be affected by the formation of the Association, or to attempt to forecast the influence which the meetings may have in this direction. It is of course true that the efficiency of philosophy, not merely in scholastic circles, but also in the wider life of society, must be to us a matter of concern. Neither can we be indifferent to the standing of philosophy in the learned world and in the esteem of the general public. But any action of the Association toward the promotion of these objects must be indirect, resulting from the effect it produces upon its members. I shall therefore pass at once to another question.

It may be expected that the existence of a separate organization for philosophy will serve as a means of communication with those whose main interest is in other departments of knowledge, and that it will thus prove a link in the federation of the sciences. The meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science on the first week of the year will soon, it is reasonable to suppose, grow into a still larger convocation, which will embrace not only workers in the natural sciences, but representatives of every specialized field of inquiry. No one can doubt that the results of such wider organization will be in every way beneficial. It will broaden the outlook of workers in special fields, and bring home to their minds the necessity of integration as well as specialization, in order that human knowledge may become actually one science or systematic whole. It is because of our interest in such a broader federation, that I think we should be careful not to restrict the proper meaning of the term 'science,' or allow the word to be monopolized by the naturalists. But whatever may be thought regarding the possibility or advisability of this wider scientific fellowship, my fellow members will, I am sure, unanimously agree with me in the statement that it is especially desirable that our relations should be close and intimate with the American Psychological Association, to whose courtesy philosophical interests in the past have owed so much, and by means of whose fostering care the present organization has grown up. The community of interest which obtains and must always continue to obtain between philosophy and psychology, as well as their historical association, would suggest the mutual advantage of holding common meetings from time to time as may be found convenient.

The question of the relation of organizations leads me to a final word regarding

the relation of philosophy to other fields of inquiry. This is a large subject to introduce at this point, but what I have to say relates to but a single aspect of it, and may perhaps be most directly stated in the following way. Philosophy must recognize that the task for which it stands cannot be accomplished by forsaking its own standpoint, and adopting that of other sciences in the attempt to imitate their procedure, no matter how fruitful or successful these methods may appear to be when applied in other fields. Philosophy has its own special standpoint and data, as well as its own special purpose, and nothing but confusion can result from any abandonment of these. This imitative tendency on the part of philosophy, the desire to affiliate with the science which appears most fruitful, or for the time has 'got the voice for excellence,' has shown itself over and over again during the last three centuries, and is still operative. In the seventeenth century, mathematics, as the ideal of the completely demonstrative science, exercised its fascination over the minds of philosophers. This influence was not confined to continental rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza, but furnished an empirical thinker like Locke with his ideal of knowledge. Indeed, it is interesting to note that just as at the present day there is a tendency to limit the term 'science' to knowledge that adopts the form of the sciences of nature, so Locke restricts the word to knowledge that can present itself in the demonstrative form of mathematics. After mathematics, mechanical physics and biology have in turn attracted many philosophical thinkers, and led them to seek to adapt their data to one or other of these standpoints, claiming that in so doing they were rendering philosophy truly scientific.

But since the data of philosophy are different from those of the physical sciences, it is never possible without violence to force upon them conceptions which were framed to comprehend facts of a totally different order. The facts of experience cannot be dealt with as if they were physical phenomena, or biological processes. It is a fundamental principle of all science that the nature of its subject-matter must dictate its method of procedure and the concepts by which it is to be interpreted. The causal principle of connection, for example, is not an empty form that is indifferent to its content and can be transferred without change of significance from one field to another.

My excuse for dwelling upon these well-worn propositions is that there seems to be an uncertainty in some quarters regarding the business of philosophy, which attempts to cover its own confusion by a blind faith that if we are fervent in protesting our love for natural science, and our determination to follow the road that it has marked out, all will go well. Statements that 'the philosopher must take his stand upon the results of natural science,' that 'he must put on the breastplate of natural knowledge,' and the like, may conceivably possess a sense in which they are true, but as commonly understood they are misleading and mischievous. Facts, in the form in which they are delivered to him by the naturalist, have in themselves no special significance for the philosopher. Nor can he use them as the foundation stones of his system. The philosopher must look at the facts, from his own standpoint, he must read them in the light of his own concepts, and cannot accept a formulation of them which is confessedly

one-sided and abstract like that of natural science. Philosophical science is not 'natural' science, and cannot 'accept its facts' from the latter. To do so would be to put 'psychologism' and 'naturalism' in place of philosophy. But philosophy, to be philosophy at all, has to *humanize* its facts, that is, to look at them from the standpoint of complete and self-conscious human experience, for it is only from this standpoint that a meaning for them can be found. The philosopher is thus essentially a humanist rather than a naturalist, and his closest affiliations are with the sciences that deal with the products of man's thought and purposive activity. In his relation to natural science, he is concerned less with the facts regarded objectively than with the thinking operations by which these facts were obtained. He does not adopt the standpoint of natural science, but transforms it utterly, and gives to natural facts a new interpretation in terms of conscious experience. Similarly, the abstract view of nature as a whole which the physical naturalist furnishes, has to be humanized by philosophical interpretation, *which construes the facts differently,* finding in nature the congeniality with the mind of man through which alone it is intelligible. And, on the other hand, the philosophical standpoint necessitates a different account of the facts of mind from that given by the psychological 'naturalist.' The merely subjective standpoint of the latter cannot be taken as starting-point any more than the merely objective standpoint of the physicist. Just as philosophy humanizes the physical facts by viewing them in relation to mind, so it also objectifies subjective facts by viewing them as functions through which the individual realizes his unity with nature and with his fellow-men.

Incomplete list of Creighton Club presidents

Below is our best attempt at reconstructing past Creighton leadership as of 2022. Obviously we are missing names for earlier than 1971, and for the 1979 gap. Any further information would of course be appreciated. Also there is uncertainty about the shuffle from odd- to even-year intervals. This may just be due to uncertainty over when the leadership "officially" changes hands: immediately after the fall conference, or in the following year? For the most recent presidents at least I am treating the change as in the new year; thus for example John Keller was responsible for the fall 2018 and 2019 conferences, and then handed over the reins to me in January 2020. (Then 2020's conference was canceled for the covid pandemic, and the 2021 centennial was delayed by the ongoing pandemic until spring 2022.)

In recent institutional memory, at least, officer positions are a six-year commitment: first two years as secretary-treasurer, then two as vice-president, and then two as president.

- 1971–73 Richard Creel
- 1973–75 Peter van Inwagen

- 1975–77 Peter Hare
- 1977–79 Thomas J. McKay
- 1979–82
- 1982–84 John E. Robertson
- 1984–86 Georges Dicker
- 1986–88 Kenneth G. Lucey
- 1988–90 Richard Feldman
- 1990–92 William Dibrell
- 1992–94 Scott Brophy
- 1994–96 Frederick Kaufman
- 1996–98 Mark Brown
- 1998–00 David White
- 2000–02 Carol Oberbrunner
- 2002–04 JeeLoo Liu
- 2004–06 Zoltán Szabó
- 2006–08 David Braun
- 2008–10 David White
- 2010–12 Harold Hodes
- 2012–14 Earl Conee
- 2014–16 Philip Reed
- 2016–18 Kris McDaniel
- 2018–20 John Keller
- 2020–22 Steve Petersen

The current (2022) vice-president is Michael Rieppel, and the current secretary-treasurer is Ben Lennertz.

Above is the only image for James Edwin Creighton yielded by a google image search. We have not been able to verify its accuracy

Incomplete record of past Creighton Club Conferences

This record was compiled with help from David Braun, Mark Brown, Harold Hodes, JeeLoo Liu, Kenneth G. Lucey, Steve Petersen, and David White; the talks before 2001 rely exclusively on JeeLoo Liu's "History of the Creighton Club".

- Pre Meeting (February 1921) Preliminary Meeting For Organization, Rochester Theological Seminary
- 1st Meeting (April 1921) Cornell University
  - Speakers: Creighton, Tuttle, Forbes
- 2nd Meeting (November 1921) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Speakers: Wilson, Paine, Cross
- 3rd Meeting (April 1922) Auburn Theological Seminary
  - Speakers: Bailie, Ogden, May, Boswell
- 4th Meeting (November 1922) Syracuse University
  - Speakers: Thilly, Forbes, Paine
- 5th Meeting (April 1923) Elmira, N.Y.
  - Speakers: Creighton, Tuttle, Bartlett
- 6th Meeting (November 1923) Rochester Theological Seminary
  - Speakers: Forbes, French, Piper
- 7th Meeting (April 1924) Cornell University
  - Speakers: Thilly, Mould, Cross
- 8th Meeting November 1924) Syracuse University
  - Speakers: Robins, Baillie, Picard
- 9th Meeting (April 1925) Auburn Theological Seminary
  - Speakers: Thilly, Stewart, Smart
- 10th Meeting (November 1925) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Speakers: Dulles, French
- 11th Meeting (April 1926) Colgate University
  - Speakers: Wilson, Barrett, Bartlett
- 12th Meeting November 1926) Elmira, N.Y.
  - Speakers: Cross, Payne, Tuttle

- 13th Meeting (April 1927) Rochester Theological Seminary
  - Speakers: Baillie, Boswell, Ward
- 14th Meeting (November 1927) Syracuse University
  - Speakers: Jones, Mould, Robins
- 15th Meeting (April 1928) Cornell University
  - Speakers: Cunningham, Boynton, Larrabee
- 16th Meeting (November 1928) Auburn, N.Y.
  - Speakers: Wilson, Mrs. Smart [*sic*], Shaw
- 17th Meeting (April 1929) University of Buffalo
  - Speakers: Murphy, Marshall, Ferber
- 18th Meeting (November 1929) Union College
  - Speakers: Bailie, Langmuir, Robinson
- 19th Meeting (April 1930) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Speakers: Boswell, Ross E. Hoople
- 20th Meeting (November 1930) University of Rochester
  - Speakers: Smart, Harkness, Van de Valle
- 21st Meeting (April 1931) Colgate University
  - Speakers: Smith, Ward, Jefferson
- 22nd Meeting (November 1931) Syracuse University
  - Speakers: Piper, Stanley, Jones
- 23rd Meeting (April 1932) Elmira, N.Y.
  - Speakers: Sabine, Harkness, Wilson, Boynton
- 24th Meeting (November 1932) Cornell University
  - Speakers: Benet, Campbell, Thilly
- 25th Meeting (April 1933) Colgate Rochester Divinity School
  - Speakers: Boswell, Brown, Van de Valle
- 26th Meeting (November 1933) Wells College
  - Speakers: Cunningham, Ross E. Hoople, Stanley
- 27th Meeting (spring 1934) Syracuse
- 28th Meeting (fall 1934) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
- 29th Meeting (spring 1935) Colgate University
- 30th Meeting (fall 1935) University of Rochester

- 31st Meeting (spring 1936) Cazenovia, N.Y.
- 32nd Meeting (fall 1936) Elmira, N.Y.
- 33rd Meeting (spring 1937) Cornell University
- 34th Meeting (fall 1937) Cazenovia, N.Y.
- 35th Meeting (spring 1938) Colgate University
- 36th Meeting (October, 1938) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - John W. Blyth (Hamilton) "Whitehead's Philosophy"
  - Paul W. Ward (Syracuse) and Philip Stanley (Union), symposium on social philosophy
- 37th Meeting (spring 1939) Rochester University
- 38th Meeting (fall 1939) Hamilton College
- 39th Meeting (April 27–28, 1940) Syracuse University
  - Leo Strauss (lecturing at Colgate, Hamilton and Amherst), "The Living Issues of German Postwar Philosophy" with special reference to Husserl's phenomenology
  - Julius Kraft (Rochester), "The Philosophy of Existence" with special reference to Heidegger and Jaspers
- 40th Meeting (fall 1940) Ithaca, N.Y.
- 41st Meeting (spring 1941) Colgate University
- 42nd Meeting (November 8–9, 1941) Wells College
  - Ross E. Hoople (Syracuse), "Philosophy and Propaganda"'
  - Robert Trayhern (University of Rochester), "An Existential Interpretation of Truth"
- 43rd Meeting (April 25–26, 1942) Elmira, N.Y.
  - Dorothy Walsh (Wells), "Art as Knowledge"
  - Brooks Otis and Scott-Craig (Hobart), "The Epistemological Value of Mythology" (symposium)
- 44th Meeting (October 24–25, 1943) Syracuse University
  - J. Calvin Keene, "The Nature of Religion"
  - Stuart M. Brown, Jr., "Schleiermacher as a Religious Empiricist"
  - George H. Sabine, "The Sociology of Knowledge"
- 45th Meeting (May 1–2, 1943) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Boswell and Dimmick (Hobart), "The Psychology of Knowledge"
  - Marvin Faber (Buffalo) "Phenomenology and Its Critics"
  - Raymond F. Piper (Syracuse), "Aesthetics"

The Club suspended operations during World War II, from the fall of 1943 through the fall of 1945. Fewer than ten members attended the 45th meeting (R. Robinson letter 9/2943). In a letter of September 11, 1945, Ward wrote to Tuttle, "Sabine says you were president of the Creighton Club when it suspended operations."

- 46th Meeting (April 13–14, 1946) Syracuse University
  - Brooks Otis, "Myth and Experience"
  - Herman Brautigam, "The Paradox of Liberalism"
  - Frederick L. Will, "Will the Future Be Like the Past"
- 47th Meeting (November 2–3, 1946) Cooperstown, N.Y.
  - Arthur E. Murphy, "The Philosophic Use of Reason"
  - Richard W. Boynton, "Is Dr. G. E. Moore a Subjectivist?"
  - Stefan Osusky, "The Russian Quest for Spiritual Union"
- 48th Meeting (April 26–27, 1947) Seneca Hotel, Rochester
  - George H. Sabine (Cornell), "Some Prospects of Democracy"
  - Milton Williams, "On the Name and Nature of Metaphysics"
  - W. W. Rogers (Colgate), "Method of Philosophy"
- 49th Meeting (November 1–2, 1947) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Edwin A. Burtt (Cornell), "The Problems of a World Philosophy"
  - Patrick Romanell (Wells), "A Naturalistic Logic *with* Metaphysics"
  - Philip Stanley (Union), "The Uses of Philosophy"
- 50th Meeting (April 24–25, 1948) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Harold E. Larrabee (Union), "Sartre's Existentialism"
  - G. Watts Cunningham (Cornell), "Creighton's Speculative Idealism"
  - Harold R. Smart on Creighton's career as teacher, editor, and administrator.
- 51st Meeting (October 30–31, 1948) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - T. V. Smith (Syracuse), "The Political Way of Life"
  - John W. Blyth (Hamilton College), "Toynbee and the Categories of Interpretation"
  - George Simpson (NYU), "The Scientist—Technician or Moralist?"
- 52nd Meeting (April 9–10, 1949) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Max Black (Cornell), "The Definition of Scientific Method"
  - Frederick C. Dommeyer (St. Lawrence), "Particulars, Proper Names and Empirical Knowledge in Russell's Theory of Knowledge"
  - Raymond F. Piper (Syracuse), "Symbolism in Contemporary Religious Art"
- 53rd Meeting (October 29–30, 1949) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Eugene T. Adams (Colgate), "Ninety Years of John Dewey"
  - Stuart M. Brown, Jr. (Cornell), "Does Ought Imply Can?"
  - Paul W. Ward (Syracuse), "War and Decadence"
- 54th Meeting (April 29–30, 1950) Cazenovia, N.Y.

  - M. Holmes Hartshorne (Colgate), "The Appeal to Experience: An Interpretation of Christian Existentialism"
  - John W. Blyth (Hamilton College), "A Critique of C. I. Lewis' *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*"
  - William E. Felch (St. Lawrence), "Lewis' Theory of the A Priori"
- 55th Meeting (October 28–29, 1950) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Lewis White Beck (University of Rochester), "Psychology and the Norms of Knowledge"
  - Max Schoen (Hamilton College), "Aesthetic Experience in the Light of Psychology"
  - Jerome Stolnitz (Colgate), "Notes on Defining the Term 'Art' "
- 56th Meeting (April 28–29, 1951) Colgate University
  - Herman Brautigam (Colgate), "Faith and Method in American Democratic Thought"
  - Norman Malcolm (Cornell), "Knowledge and Belief'
  - Paul Hayner (Hamilton College), "Kierkegaard and 'Religious Truth' "
- 57th Meeting (October 27–28, 1951) Colgate University
  - Raymond F. Piper (Syracuse), review of *Beyond Mythology* by Richard W. Boynton (Buffalo), with reply by Boynton
  - Dorion Cairns, "Husserl's Concepts of Intentionality and of Phenomenological Reduction"
  - Justus Hartnack, "The Alleged Privacy of Experience"
- 58th Meeting: No Record
- 59th Meeting (November 1–2, 1952) Syracuse University
  - Gregory Vlastos (Cornell), "Will, Obligation, and the Social Contract"
  - Melbourne Evans (Syracuse), "Aristotle, Newton, and Modern Science"
  - Kurt Neuse (St. Lawrence), "Karl Jaspers' Existentialism"
- 60th Meeting (April 25–26, 1953) Hamilton College
  - Arthur E. Murphy (Cornell), "Reasons in Ethics"
  - Sidney Albert (Harpur), "Aristotle's Poetics"
  - Theodore Mischel (Colgate), "The Meanings of 'Symbol' in Literature"
- 61st Meeting (October 31–November 1, 1953) Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Kenneth Morgan (Colgate), "Comments on Hinduism"
  - Frederick Dommeyer (St. Lawrence), "Psychical Phenomena: Fraud, Delusion, or Fact?"
  - Martin A. Greenman (Rochester), "Philosophical Implications of Psychical Research"

There are no records from 1954 to 1968.

- 91st Meeting (October 24–24, 1969) NYT Motor Lodge, Victor, NY
  - Keynote Address: J. O. Urmson, "Successes and Mercies"
- 92nd Meeting (April 17–18, 1970) Ithaca College
  - Keynote Address: Herman Wein, "Some Remarks on the Different Appraisals of Wittgenstein's Work in Germany and in America: a re-evaluation of 'meta-philosophy' "
- 93rd Meeting (Fall 1970) Oasis Motor, Rt. 7, Oneonta, NY
  - Keynote Address: Antony Flew, "Must Morality? What Socrates Should Have Said to Thrasymachus"
- 94th Meeting (April 16–17, 1971) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Svetozar Stojanovic, (University of Beograd, Yugoslavia) "Human Nature and Three Models of Post-Revolutionary Development (Stalinism, Maoism, Titoism)"
- 95th Meeting (October 29–30, 1971) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Alburey Castell (College of Wooster) "Two Senses of Rational"
  - Martin C. Dillon (SUNY Binghamton) "Nietzsche: Deception and Authenticity"
  - Lauchlin D. MacDonald (SUNY Fredonia) "An Analysis of Reality"
  - Richard Hall (SUNY Buffalo) "Criteria for Identity"
  - William Edgar (SUNY Geneseo) "Are Contradictions Intelligible?"
- 96th Meeting (April 14–15,1972) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: George Schrader (Yale University) "On Treating a Person as a Person"
  - Ferdinand Schoeman (SUNY Binghamton) "A Rational Approach to the Foundation of Ethics: *Ethica in ordine geometrico demonstrata*"
  - Robert Almeder (SUNY Oswego) "On the Indirect Justification of Use Analysis"
  - Panel Discussion: R. P. Blackwood, Julian Davies, M. C. Dillon, Dane Gordon, Richard Hull, Ferdinanad Schoeman, Richard Taylor, Edward Miller, and others "Why Should Anyone Refrain from Stealing?"
- 97th Meeting (October 27–28, 1972) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Georg Henrik von Wright "The Logic of Ought to Do" or "Deontic Logic Revisited"
  - John T. Kearns (SUNY Buffalo) "The Sense of a Proper Name"
  - G. H. Merrill (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Necessity and Essence"
  - Panel Discussion: Morton Schagrin, R. T. Blackwood, John C. Carbonara, Richard E. Creel, M. C. Dillon "Is It Ever Reasonable to be Unreasonable?"

- 98th Meeting (April 13–14, 1973) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Richard Taylor, (University of Rochester) "The Soul"
  - Anthony Preus, (SUNY Binghamton) "Aristotle's Three Theories of the Soul"
  - Eileen Serene (Cornell University Graduate Student) "Descartes' Notion of Truth"
  - Richard Hull (SUNY Buffalo) "Evidence, Incorrigibility, and Acquaintance"
- 99th Meeting (November 2–3, 1973) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Joel Feinberg (Rockefeller University) "Animal Rights and Human Duties"
  - Robert Simon (Hamilton College) "Egalitarian Redistribution and the Significance of Context"
  - Panel Discussion: Michael V. Chiareiello, Lauchlin D. MacDonald, Richard Reilly & Donald Weiss "Is There Such a Thing as Practical Reason?"
  - David Lyons (Cornell University) "The Incoherence of Ethical Relativism"
- 100th Meeting (April 5–6, 1974) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Alan White, "Believing What One Knows"
  - Thomas Perry (SUNY Buffalo) "Judicial Discretion Affirmed"
  - Alan Gettner (SUNY Purchase) "Wittgenstein's Disclaimer"
- 101st Meeting (October 18–19, 1974) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Richard M. Hare, "Utilitarianism: Some Necessary Distinctions"
  - Herman A. Brautigam, "The Creighton Club (1921–1974): Historical Notes and Reminiscences"
  - John Kekes (SUNY Albany) "Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration"
  - Michael Tye (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "The Adverbial Theory: A Defense of Sellars Against Jackson"
  - Carol Ann & Kenneth G. Lucey (Jamestown Community College & SUNY Fredonia) "On Causal Contribution"
- 102nd Meeting (April 11–12, 1975) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Vere Chappell, "Descartes and Hume on Ideas"
  - David Palmer (SUNY Fredonia) "Unfelt Pains"
  - Allard Bomer Dembe (Cornell University Graduate Student) "Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and the Limits of Scientific Investigation"
  - Philip W. Bennett (SUNY Cortland) "Remembering and Causality"
- 103rd Meeting(October 17–18, 1975) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.

  - Keynote Address: James Cornman (University of Pennsylvania) "Might a Tooth Ache But There Be No Toothache?"
  - Carl Ginet (Cornell University) "Incompatibilism vs. the Conditional Analysis of Freedom"
  - Alan Sobel (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "Slavery Contracts, Euthanasia and Legal Paternalism" (paper not in the proceedings)
  - Jesse Kalin (Vassar College), "Lies, Secrets and Love: The Inadequacy of Contemporary Moral Theory"

- 104th Meeting (April 23–24, 1976) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Morris Weitz (Brandeis University) "The Concept of Art"
  - Albert W. Flores (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) "Identity, the Identity Theory and the Double Language Theory"
  - Roderick M. Stewart (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Conventional Meaning in *Sein und Zeit*"
  - Richard R. LaCroix (SUC Buffalo) "Aquinas on the Self-Evidence of God's Existence"

- 105th Meeting (October 22–23, 1976) Hamilton College
  - Keynote Address: Basil Mitchell (Oxford University) "Faith and Reason: A False Antithesis?"
  - Clifford E. Williams (Saint John Fisher College) "The Unreality of Becoming"
  - Hilary Kornblith (Cornell University Graduate Student) "In Defense of an Intentional Analysis of Meaning"
  - Richard Feldman (University of Rochester) "Beliefs And Inscriptions"

- 106th Meeting **in Honor of Max Black** (May 6–7, 1977) Hamilton College
  - Keynote Address: Max Black (Cornell University & Hamilton College) "Humaneness"
  - Joel Kidder (Syracuse University) "Successful Punishing: A Gricean Formulation"
  - Sarah O'B. Conly (Cornell University Graduate Student) "Hare's Moral Imperative"
  - Georges Dicker (SUNY Brockport) "Primary & Secondary Qualities: A Proposed Modification of the Lockean Account"

- 107th Meeting (October 21–22, 1977) Colgate University
  - Keynote Address: Robert Ackermann (University of Masachusetts at Amherst) "Rationality and Choice"
  - Newton Garver (SUNY, Buffalo) "... that I *know* I am in pain"
  - Ron Messerich (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Two types of Explanation of Human behavior"
  - Kenneth s. Friedman (SUC, Oswego) "Undergraduate Causality"

- 108th Meeting (April 14–15, 1978) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Jonathan Bennett (University of British Columbia) "The Time-Traveler's Freedom"
  - Alexander Rosenberg (Syracuse University) "Obstacles to the Nomological Connection of Reason and Actions"
  - Michael R. Schmidt (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "Necessity and Grammar"
  - Ute H. St. Clair (SUNY Oneonta) "Theories of Memory: The Heart of the Controversy"
- 109th Meeting (October 27–28, 1978) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Alvin Plantinga (Calvin College) "Existentialism"
  - Lynne Baker (Middlebury College) "Why Computers Can't Act"
  - Jeffrey Crawford (Central State University, Ohio) "Shuttle Diplomacy Between Possible Worlds or Towards a Separate Ontological Peace"
  - Robert L. Schwager (SUNY Cortland) "Abortion & the Right to Life"
- 110th Meeting (May 4–5, 1979) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Nicholas Rescher (University of Pittsburgh) "On the Nature of 'Things' "
  - Jonathan Schonsheck (Le Moyne College) "On Feinberg's 'Voluntariness Tribunal' "
  - Michael Losonsky (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Beliefs and Representations"
  - Clifford Williams (St. John Fisher College) "On Human Freedom: A Critique of the Theory of Agency"
- 111th Meeting (October 26–27, 1979) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: William Alston (Syracuse University) "Truth and Sentence Meaning"
  - Jack Wilcox (SUNY Binghamton) "Is the Original Position 'Impartial'?"
  - Paul Weirich (University of Rochester) "A Bias of Rationality"
  - Charles Echelbarger (SUNY Oswego) "Scheffler on Believing-True"
- 112th Meeting (May 2–3, 1980)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Susan Haack, "Dummett's Justification of Deduction"
  - M. C. Dillon (SUNY Binghamton) "The Phenomenon of Obscenity and its Manifestation in Literature"
  - Cindy D. Stern (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Lewis' Counterfactual Analysis of Causation"
  - Georges Dicker (SUNY Brockport) "Berkeley on Immediate Perception"
- 113th Meeting (October 24–25, 1980)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.

- Keynote Address: David Lewis (Princeton University) "Causal Explanation"
- Rita Nolan (Harvard University & SUNY Stony Brook) "The Doctrine of Necessity Naturalized"
- Peter van Inwagen (Syracuse University) "Here Isn't a Hand and Here Isn't Another Hand"
- Kenneth Stem (SUNY Albany) "Moral Objectivism and Moral Truth"

- 114th Meeting (Mav 8–9, 1981)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University) "The Inverted Spectrum"
  - Jonathan Schonsheck (Le Mayne College), "Hobbling Ideas and Unfettered Expression: First Amendment Rights and Restrictions"
  - David White (St. John Fisher College) "Slippery Slope Arguments"
  - Mark Heller (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "In Defense of Compatibilism"

- 115th Meeting (October 2–3, 1981) Syracuse University
  - Keynote Address: Roderick M. Chisholm (Brown University) "Knowing That One Knows"
  - Terence Irwin (Cornell University) "The Good Will in Greek Ethics"
  - Daniel Little (Colgate University) "Justification in *A Theory of Justice*"
  - Barry Gan (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "An Argument Against Conscription"

- 116th Meeting (April 2–3, 1982) University of Rochester
  - Keynote Address: Henry Kyburg, Jr. (University of Rochester) "Rational Belief"
  - R. F. Frohock (Syracuse University) "Moral Paradoxes and Individual Rationality"
  - William Rapaport (SUNY Fredonia) "Is There Progress in Philosophy?"
  - David Sedlock (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Simple Logical Truths, Introspection, and Hume"

- 117th Meeting (November 5–6, 1982)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N. Y.
  - Keynote Address: Fred Dretske (University of Wisconsin) "The Epistemology of Belief"
  - Richard Taylor (University of Rochester) "The Basis of Political Authority"
  - Patrick M. O'Neil (SUNY Binghamton) "The Fate on Non-Natural Facts in the Original Position of John Rawl's *A Theory of Justice*"
  - Carolyn Korsmeyer (SUNY Buffalo) "Pictorial Assertion"

- 118th Meeting (April 15–16, 1983) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.

  - Keynote Address: Nicholas Walterstorff (Calvin College) "Are Texts Autonomous? An Interaction with the Hermeneutic of Paul Ricoeur"
  - Jack Glickman (SUNY Brockport) "The Art Critic: An Unconventional View"
  - Glenn A. Hartz (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Launching a Materialist Ontology: the Leibnizian Way"
  - David Seligman (Skidmore College) "Is That a Threat or a Promise?"
- 119th Meeting (November 4–5, 1983) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Norman Kretzmann (Cornell University) "The (Indefinite) Truth About Tomorrow's Sea Battle"
  - Clyde L. Hardin (Syracuse University) "Are 'Scientific' Objects Colored?"
  - James B. Griffis (University of Buffalo Graduate Student) "Why Adverbial Theories Will Never Work"
  - Charles J. List (SUNY Plattsburgh) "Methodology & the Evolution of Scientific Fraud"
- 120th Meeting (April 6–7, 1984)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: David K. Lewis (Princeton University) "Putnam's Paradox"
  - Richard Feldman (University of Rochester) "Reliability and Justification"
  - M. Emanuela Galanti (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "An Interpretation of Plato's Method of Division"
  - William Dibrell (Alfred University) "Persons and the Intentional Stance"
- 121st Meeting (November 16–17, 1984)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: David Kaplan (University of California at Los Angeles) "Opacity"
  - Jennifer Church (Vassar College) "What It Takes To Be An Internal Realist"
  - Robert Amico (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "On Vindication"
  - Sharon Anderson-Gold (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) "The 'Right' of War: A Kantian Critique"
- 122nd Meeting (April 19–20, 1985)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: David Sanford (Duke University) "How an Acceptable Conditional Can Fail the Ramsey Test"
  - Newton Garver (SUNY Buffalo) "Wittgenstein's Form of Life"
  - Sterling Harwood (Cornell University Graduate Student) "Taking Scepticism Seriously—And in Context"
  - Michael Losonsky (SUNY Oswego) "Actualism and Realism"
- 123rd Meeting (October 4–5, 1985)) Lincklaen House, Cazenovia, N.Y.

  - Keynote Address: Rom Harré (Oxford University) "The Social Construction of Mind"
  - John Robertson (Syracuse University) "Intemalism about Moral Reasons"
  - Mark A. Stone (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Natural Selection and Naturalized Epistemology"
  - Jerrold Aronson (SUNY Binghamton) "The Raven Returns"

- 124th Meeting (April 25–26, 1986) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Eli Hirsch (Brandeis University) "Strange Thoughts of the Third Kind: An Examination of Alternative Ways of Conceptualization"
  - Richard Taylor (University of Rochester) "Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly"
  - Stefan Sencerz (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics"
  - Natika Newton (Nassau County Community College) "Churchland on Direct Introspection of Brain States"

- 125th Meeting (October 10–11, 1986) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Fred Feldman (The University of Massachusetts, Amherst) "Two Questions About Pleasure"
  - Georges Dicker (SUNY Brockport) "The Limits of Cartesian Dualism"
  - Paul Scatena (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Pains, Sensations, and Functionalisms"
  - John T. Wilcox (SUNY Binghamton) "Nature as Demonic in Thompson's Defense of Abortion"

- 126th Meeting (April 17–18, 1987) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Roderick M. Chisholm (Brown University) "The Evidence of the Senses"
  - Joel Kidder (Syracuse University) "Utilitarianism, Sympathy, and Bentham's Argument"
  - John J. Tilley (University of Wisconsin) "Harman's Moral 'Relativism' "
  - Robert Amico (St. Bonaventure University) "Roderick Chisholm and the Problem of the Criterion"

- 127th Meeting (October 23–24, 1987) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Peter van Inwagen (Syracuse University) "How to Reason About Vague Objects"
  - Pat Manfredi (Hamilton College) "Instrumentalism and the Causal Powers of the Attitudes"
  - Paul Hrycai (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Function of Language"

- Earl Conee (University of Rochester) "Why Moral Dilemmas Are Impossible"

- 128th Meeting (April 22–23, 1988) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Robert Stalnaker (Cornell University) "The Autonomy of Semantics"
  - Marilyn McCord Adams (UCLA), "Theodicy Without Blame"
  - Mariam Thalos (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Aristotle's Theory of Mathematics"
  - Margery Bedford Naylor (Syracuse University) "An Embarrassment of Help"

- 129th Meeting (October 28–29, 1988) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: John Pollock (University of Arizona) "Understanding the Language of Thought"
  - John Sanders (Rochester Institute of Technology) "The Value of Freedom"
  - Jan A. Cover (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Relations and Reduction in Leibniz"
  - Robert Amico (St. Bonaventure University) "Sextus Emiricus and Self-Refutation"

- 130th Meeting (April 14–15, 1989) The Aurora Inn Aurora, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: William Lycan (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) "What is the Subjectivity of the Mental?"
  - Dorit Bar-On (University of Rochester), "On the Possibility of a 'Solitary' Language"
  - Frances Howard (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "*De Re* Modality Entails *De Re* Vagueness"
  - Timothy Shiell (SUNY Oswego) "Integrity and Political Obligation"
  - Kaminsky, Jack. "In Memoriam: Max Black"

- 131st Meeting (October 6–7, 1989) The Aurora Inn, Aurora, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Robert Sleigh (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) "Foundations of Leibniz's Metaphysics"
  - Lawrence D. Roberts (SUNY Binghamton) "Existence and Identity Contexts as Maintenance Operations on Reference"
  - Alastair Norcross (Syracuse University) "Incommensurability of Moral Values"
  - John Morreall (Rochester Institute of Technology) "Humor and Rationality"

- 132nd Meeting (April 20–21, 1990) The Aurora Inn, Aurora, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Lynne Rudder Baker (Middlebury College & University of Massachusetts, Amherst) "The Myth of Folk Psychology"

  - Frederick Kaufinan (Ithaca College) "Moral Realism and Moral Judgments"
  - Ralph Baergen (Syracuse University) "An Account of Belief Formation"
  - David Braun (University of Rochester) "Belief and the Cognitive Content of Names"

- 133rd Meeting (November 2–3, 1990) The Aurora Inn, Aurora, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Jules Coleman (Yale University) "Corrective Justice"
  - Georges Dicker (SUNY Brockport) "Hume's Fork Revisited"
  - Teresa McGarrity (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "The Possibility of Amoralism"
  - Jonathan Schonsheck (Le Moyne College) "On Sheep and Men; Feinberg and Arneson on Bestiality and the Criminalization of Harmless Wrongdoing"

- 134th Meeting (April 5–6, 1991) Hobart And William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Alvin Goldman (University of Arizona) "The Psychology of Folk Psychology"
  - Earl Conee (University of Rochester) "Truth, Justification, and Knowledge"
  - Phil Goggans (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Backward Counterfactuals"
  - Joel Kidder (Syracuse University) "Kant's Consequentialism"

- 135th Meeting (November 8–9, 1991) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Jose Benardete (Syracuse University) "The Ring of Gyges: An Aristotelian Approach to Ethics"
  - Edward Wierenga (University of Rochester) "Ockhamism and Prophecy"
  - Joe Moore (Cornell University Graduate Student) "A Counter-Example to 'Self-Evident' Principles of Be1ief Ascription"
  - Edward Covey (Russell Sage College) "The Ethical Status of Humanity"

- 136th Meeting (April 10–11, 1992) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Joseph Margolis (Temple University) "The Defeat of the Computational Model of Mind"
  - Stephen Schwartz (Ithaca College) "The Status of Nietzsche's Theory of the Will to Power in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy of Science"
  - Stephen Maitzen (Cornell University Graduate Student) "The Real Epistemic Aim"
  - James Cain (University of Rochester) "Metaphysical Compatibilism"

- 137th Meeting (October 9–10, 1992) Hobart and William Smith Colleges

- Keynote Address: Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame) "An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism"
- John Morreall (Rochester Institute of Technology) "Fear Without Belief'
- Eric Reitan (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "Causal Necessity Within a Humean Framework"
- Richard Taylor (University of Rochester) "The Utilitarian Fallacy"

- 138th Meeting (April 23–24,1993) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Samuel Gorovitz (Syracuse University) "Whose Patient Am I Anyway?"
  - John Sanders (Rochester Institute of Technology) "Honor Among Thieves: Some Reflections on Professional Codes of Ethics"
  - Paul Bloomfield (Syracuse University Graduate Student) "Dennett's Misrememberings"
  - Carlos Prado (Queen's university, Canada) "Why Analysis of Humor Seems Funny"

- 139th Meeting (March 25–26, 1994) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Bernard Williams (University of Oxford & U.C. Berkeley) "The End of Moral Responsibility"
  - Kenneth G. Lucey (SUNY Fredonia) "An Invalid Instance of Modus Ponens"
  - Barry Smith (SUNY Buffalo) "Zeno's Paradox for Colors"
  - Bernard Roddy (University of Rochester Graduate Student) "Epistemically Rational Believing"
  - Andrew Norman (Hamilton College) "Teaching Wisdom"

- 140th Meeting (April 7–8, 1995) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: John McDowell (University of Pittsburgh) "Schema/Content Dualism and Empiricism"
  - Stephen Maitzan (Hobart and William Smith Colleges) "The Instability of Moral Skepticism"
  - Clyde L. Hardin (Syracuse University) "Reinverting the Spectrum"
  - Michael Lynch (Syracuse University) "The Self-Destruction of Reason"
  - Gary Johnson (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) "An Unfortunate Ideal"

- 141st Meeting (March 15–16, 1996) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Richard Rorty, "McDowell, Davidson, and Spontaneity"
  - Shaun Gallagher (Canisius College) "First Perception: A New Solution to the Molyneux Problem"
  - Michael McKenna (Ithaca College) "The Limit of Evil and the Role of Moral Address"

  - Martino Traxler (Cornell University) “Harm Refined for the Sake of Your Needs”
  - Mariam Thalos (SUNY Buffalo) “Against Common Sense”

- 142nd Meeting (March 14–15, 1997) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Henry Shue (Cornell University) “Global Justice”
  - Robert M. Seltzer (SUNY Albany) “A Hybrid Theory of Demonstrative Reference”
  - Patrick O’Neil (Broome Community College) “The Humean Is/Ought Problem Resolved”
  - Richard Main (SUNY Buffalo) “Denying Knowledge to Make Room for Ignorance”
  - Mariam Thalos (SUNY Buffalo) “The Individuation of Dilemmas”

- 143rd Meeting (March 27–28, 1998) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Nuel Belnap (University of Pittsburgh) “Modest Notions of Free Will and Indeterminism”
  - Ted Everett (SUNY Geneseo) “Observation and the Problem of Induction”
  - Robert P. Amico (St. Bonaventure University) “Against the Pyrrhonists”
  - Carlo Filice (SUNY Geneseo) “Libertarianism, Motivation, and the Self”
  - Mark A. Bross (SUNY Buffalo) “Does Berkeley Believe in Public Objects?”

- 144th Meeting (March 26–27, 1999) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Barry Loewer (Rutgers University) “Physicalism and Its Discontents”
  - Robert Hallborg (Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, N.Y.) “The Necessity Defense and Justice”
  - Insu Kim (SUNY Buffalo Graduate Student) “Speech Act Classification”
  - JeeLoo Liu (SUNY Geneseo) “A Nonreductionist Solution to Kim’s Explanatory Exclusion Problem”
  - Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca College) “Why it is Impossible to be Moral”

- 145th Meeting (November 12–13, 1999) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University) “Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and the ‘Explanatory Gap’ ”
  - Dale Jacquette (The Pennsylvania State University) “Identity, Intensionality, and Moore’s paradox”
  - Jessica Wilson (Cornell University) [Graduate Student Award] “A Metaphysical Definition of Emergence”

  - Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (The University of Rochester) "Internalism Defended"
  - Jonathan Jacobs (Colgate University) "The Reconstruction of Teleology in Contemporary Metaethics"
  - Richard Taylor, The University of Rochester (Emeritus) "Philosophical Viruses"

- 146th Meeting (November 4, 2000) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Fred Dretske (Duke University) "How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?"
  - Mark Moyer (Rutgers University) [Graduate Student Award] "Should We Swallow Worms or Worm Slices?"
  - Neil Feit (SUNY Fredonia) "The Structure of Higher Goods"
  - Robert Amico (St. Bonaventure University) "Is A Fully General Theory of Knowledge Possible?"
  - John Capps (Rochester Institute of Technology) "Can Beliefs Be Prima Facie Justified?"

- 147th Meeting (October 20, 2001) Cornell University
  - Keynote Address: Tyler Burge (UCLA) "Memory and Persons"
  - Pekka Väyrynen (Cornell University) [Graduate Student Award] "Why Epistemic Norms Are Not Hypothetical Imperatives"
  - Daniel Nolan (Syracuse University) "Stoic Gunk"
  - Ted Everett (SUNY Geneseo) "Conditional Knowledge and Skepticism"
  - Alan C. Clune (University at Buffalo) "Prospects for A Scientific Intentional Psychology"

- 148th Meeting (October 26, 2002) Cornell University
  - Keynote Address: John Perry (Stanford University) "Epistemic Possibility"
  - Marc A. Moffett (University of Colorado, Boulder) [Graduate Student Award] "Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution To the Problem of Doxastic Shift"
  - Rachel Cohon (SUNY Albany) "Hume on Moral Sensing and the 'Modern Philosophy' "
  - Neil A. Manson (Virginia Commonwealth University) "The Uniqueness of the Universe"
  - David Braun (University of Rochester) and Theodore Sider (Rutgers University) "Vagueness and Truth"

- 149th Meeting (November 8, 2003) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame University) "The End is Nigh: An Adventure in Rational Eschatology"
  - Christopher Kane (Brown University) [Graduate Student Award] "Paying the Price for the Transitivity of Causation"

- Tomasz Bigaj (Rowan University) "Causes, Conditions, and Counterfactuals"
- Jason Kawall (Colgate University) "The Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories"
- Benj Hellie (Cornell University) "On What Exists"

- l50th Meeting (November 6, 2004) The Sherwood Inn, Skaneateles, N.Y.
  - Keynote Address: Robert Stalnaker (MIT) "Knowing Where We Are, and What It Is Like"
  - Matthew Haug (Cornell University Graduate Student) "A Novel Solution to the Exclusion Problem"
  - Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University) "A Definition of 'Disposition' "
  - Georges Dicker (SUNY Brockport) "Kant's Refutation of Idealism"
  - Ben Bradley (Syracuse University) "Egoistic Concern, Narrative Unity and the Worst Time to Die"

- 151st Meeting (October 1, 2005) Cornell University
  - Keynote Address: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan) "Rational Credence and the Value of Truth"
  - Christopher Tillman (University of Rochester) [Graduate Student Award] "Contextualism, Iterated Attitude Reports, and Generality"
  - James Beebe (SUNY University at Buffalo) "BonJour's *A Priori* Solution to the Problem of Induction"
  - Eric Hiddleston (Wayne State University) "The Reductivist's Troubles With Mental Causation"
  - Kris McDaniel (Syracuse University) "An Argument for the Possibility of Extended Simples"

- 152nd Meeting (November 4, 2006) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Jeff McMahan (Rutgers University) "On the Moral Equality of Combatants"
  - Joshua Spencer (University of Rochester) [Graduate Student Award] "A Tale of Two Simples"
  - Neil Feit (SUNY Fredonia) "Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of the Attitudes"
  - Ishani Maitra (Syracuse University) "Why Take Our Word for It?"
  - David Hershenov (SUNY University at Buffalo) "A More Palatable Epicureanism"

- 153rd Meeting (November 3, 2007) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Nicholas Sturgeon (Cornell University) "Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative"
  - Shay Welch (Binghamton University) [Graduate Student Award] "The Ambigendered Übermensch"
  - P. D. Magnus (SUNY Albany) "What SPECIES can teach us about THEORY"

- Barbara Lowe (St. John Fisher College) "Receptive Perception, Particularized Justice and Moral Agency"
- Georges Dicker (SUNY Brockport) "Hume on the Intermittent Existence of the Objects of the Senses"

- 154th Meeting (October 18, 2008) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Arthur Fine (University of Washington) "Structural Realism, Then and Now" (Fine was ill and could not attend)
  - Daniel Koltonski (Cornell University) [Graduate Student Award] "Deferential Friends"
  - David Hershenov (University at Buffalo, SUNY) "Organisms, Persons, and Bioethics"
  - Kimberly Blessing (Buffalo State College, SUNY) "Acting with Cartesian Resolve"
  - Christy MagUidir (Cornell University) "Limited Additions to Limited Editions"

- 155th Meeting (October 24, 2009) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Ruth G. Millikan (University of Connecticut) "Finally implementing the eviction notices; chucking meaning out of the head"
  - Mihnea Capraru (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Russellian Semantics of Belief Reports"
  - Carlo Filice (SUNY at Geneseo) "Libertarian Autonomy and Intrinsic Motives"
  - David Liebesman (Boston University) "Simple Generics"
  - Julie Ponesse (SUNY at Brockport) "*Enthusiasmos* and Unnatural Natures in the Eudemian Ethics VIII, 2"

- 156th Meeting (November 13, 2010) Hobart and Williams Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Fred Feldman (University of Massachusetts Amherst) "What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do"
  - Aaron Wolf (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Giving Up Hume's Guillotine"
  - K. Bray Wray (SUNY Oswego) "Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate"
  - Mark Spencer (SUNY Buffalo) [Graduate Student Award] "Eternal and Historical Kinds"
  - Rachel Cohon (SUNY Albany) "Hume's Moral Sentiments as Motives"

- 157th Meeting (November 5, 2011) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) "The Openness of Illusions"
  - Kelly Anne McCormick (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Problems for Revisionism about Moral Responsibility"

  - John Keller (Niagara University) "Paraphrase, Semantics, and Ontology"
  - Richard Reilly (St. Bonaventure University) "Can Libertarianism Account for Weakness of Will?"
  - Daniel Koltonski (SUNY Binghamton) "Personal Pursuits, Global Poverty, and the Demands of Beneficence"

- 158th Meeting (November 10, 2012) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Thomas Hurka (University of Toronto) "Aristotle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong, and Wrong"
  - Andrew Specht (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Rethinking the Neglected Alternative"
  - Stephen Kershnar (SUNY Fredonia) "The Surprisingly Weak Duty to Obey Military Orders"
  - Ted Everett (SUNY Geneseo) "Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rationality"
  - Lorraine Juliano Keller: "Logical Form and Structured Propositions"

- 159th Meeting (November 2, 2013) Hobart and William Smith Colleges
  - Keynote Address: Ned Block (New York University) "Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science"
  - Steve Steward (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Luck and Control"
  - Jason Kawall (Colgate University) "Evaluating the Epistemic Status of the Testimony of Converts"
  - Heidi Savage (SUNY Geneseo) "Kypris, Aphrodite, and Venus: Another Puzzle About Belief"
  - Jason D'Cruz (SUNY Albany) "Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency"

- 160th Meeting (September 27, 2014) Syracuse University
  - Keynote Address: Karen Bennett (Cornell University) "Building and Causing"
  - Kirsten Egerstrom (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Meaning Without Fulfillment"
  - Bradford Skow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) "Explanations, Why-Questions, Reasons, and Causes"
  - Neil Sinhababu (National University of Signapore) "Ethical Reductionism"
  - David James Barnett (Union College): "A Puzzle about Perceptual Justification"

- 161st Meeting (October 17, 2015) Syracuse University
  - Keynote Address: Kieran Setiya (MIT) "Retrospection"
  - Travis Timmerman (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Speciesism is False by (Most) Speciesists' Own Lights"

  - Steve Petersen (Niagara University) "Composition as Pattern"
  - David Hershenov (University at Buffalo) and Rose Hershenov (Niagara University) "The Potential of Potentiality Arguments"
  - Nathan Ballantyne (Fordham University) "Verbal Disagreement in Philosophy"

- 162nd Meeting (October 1, 2016) Syracuse University
  - Keynote Address: Achille Varzi (Columbia University) "Fads and Fallacies of Analytic Ontology"
  - Philip Corkum (University of Alberta) "Metaphysical Explanation"
  - Shieva Kleinschmidt (University of Southern California) "Fusion First"
  - Kolja Keller (University of Rochester) [Graduate Student Award] "Vagueness and Luminosity"
  - Stefanie Rocknak (Hartwick College) "Hume and the External World"

- 163rd Meeting (September 23, 2017) Syracuse University
  - Keynote Address: Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University) "The Duty to Object"
  - Einar Bohn (University of Agder) "Panpsychism, the Combination Problem, and Plural Properties"
  - Paul Silva (University of Pennsylvania) "Justified Group Belief Is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief"
  - Sam Kampa (Fordham University) [Graduate Student Award] "Imaginative Immersion"
  - Cassie Herbert (Hobart and William Smith Colleges) "Derogatives: Beyond Insults and Slurs"

- 164th Meeting (November 3, 2018) Syracuse University
  - Keynote Address: Anja Jauernig (New York University) "How to be an Idealist and a Realist at the Same Time, Kantian Style"
  - Stephen Kershnar (SUNY Fredonia) "Consequentialism and the Case of Symmetrical Attackers"
  - Benjamin Lennertz (Colgate University) "Probabilism without Arguments"
  - Arturo Javier-Castellanos (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "A Counterpart-Theoretic Response to Heller's Argument Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy"
  - Adam Kolber (Brooklyn Law School) "The Time Frame Challenge to Retributivism"

- 165th Meeting (September 7, 2019) Syracuse University
  - Thomas Kelly (Princeton University) "Why Political Polarization Will Get Worse If People Are Rational"
  - Maura Tumulty (Colgate University) "Problematic Perception: Beyond Projection and Misattribution"
  - Evan Woods (Denison University) "Solving the Personite Problem"

  - Byron Simmons (Syracuse University) [Graduate Student Award] "Should an Ontological Pluralist be a Quantificational Pluralist?"
  - John Lawless (Utica College) "More Than a Capacity: Agency, Oppression, and Paternalism"

The 2020 meeting was cancelled because of the Covid-19 pandemic; Quayshawn Spencer (University of Pennsylvania) had been slated to give the keynote, and was unable to make the next year's "All-Keynote" Centennial—which was itself delayed by the ongoing pandemic until Spring 2022.

- 166th *Centennial* Meeting (April 8–9, 2022) Colgate University
  - Keynote Addresses:
    * Nicole Hassoun (Binghamton University) "The Minimally Good Life Account of What We Owe to Others and Can Demand as a Basic Minimum" (Friday evening, sponsored by Colgate University)
    * Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts Amherst) "Why Concepts Cannot, Should Not, and Need Not be Engineered"
    * Earl Conee (University of Rochester) "Against Absurdity"
    * Jessica Moss (New York University) "Aristotle's Knowledge"
    * Ted Sider (Rutgers University) "3D in High-D"
  - Graduate Student Awards (parallel presentations):
    * Alex Horne (University of Cambridge) "The Self Improvement Machine"
    * Thiago Xavier de Melo (Syracuse University) "Naive Positionalism and Relative Discernibility"
    * Hannah Winckler-Olick (Cornell University) "de Beauvoir on Value Creation as Complicity"